Conflict drives mass displacement and high food prices, resulting in Crisis

Key Messages

• Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected in South Lebanon, El Nabatieh, Baalbak-El Hermel, Akkar, and North Lebanon governorates through at least May 2025. In the south, intensifying conflict continues to cause civilian casualties, population displacement, and severe disruptions to livelihoods. Meanwhile, in North Lebanon, Akkar, and Baalbek-El Hermel, many Syrian and Palestinian refugees as well as Lebanese host households are unable to cope with high food prices amid reductions in both income and humanitarian assistance. 
• FEWS NET assesses the population in need of urgent humanitarian food assistance to be 2.0-2.49 million people, with needs expected to increase through May as the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) grows.  The populations of highest concern include poor rural agricultural communities, Syrian and Palestinian refugees, IDPs, and those located in areas facing ongoing hostilities.
• The Israel Defense Force’s (IDF) aerial bombing campaign has caused widespread destruction to civilian infrastructure (such as farmland, buildings, and residential blocks) across southern and eastern Lebanon, including the southern suburbs of Beirut. Since October 2023, more than 2,500 Lebanese have been killed and approximately 835,000 people have been displaced. According to IOM, South Lebanon and El Nabatieh have the highest rates of outmigration, while Mount Lebanon and Akkar are hosting the highest number of IDPs.
• Since the escalation of hostilities in September 2024, approximately 440,000 people have crossed into Syria (around 70 percent Syrian refugees). However, Lebanon closed its two eastern border crossings with Syria on October 25 following an Israeli strike on the Syrian side of the Al-Qaa border crossing. The border closure is now hindering population movement and commercial trade. Given that many Lebanese traders typically rely on informal cross-border trade and market activities, this is affecting household income and the prices of essential goods among communities located along the eastern border.

Food security context

Since the 2006 Lebanon War, the conflict between Lebanon and Israel has been marked by periodic escalations. The situation has intensified in recent years, with significant cross-border skirmishes and major confrontations. In October 2023, conflicts within the broader Middle East region led to heightened tensions and hostilities between Lebanon – specifically Hezbollah – and Israel. In September 2024, Israel launched a ground invasion into southern Lebanon coordinated with an increase in aerial attacks (Figure 1), resulting in widespread destruction and displacement.

Figure 1

Air and artillery strikes across Lebanon, October 8 2023 – October 31 2024

Source: FEWS NET with data from ACLED

The enduring economic crisis in Lebanon – sustained by concurrent shocks such as the 2020 Beirut Port explosion and the COVID-19 pandemic – has led to the devaluation of the Lebanese pound (LBP), which has lost 95 percent of its value against the USD since 2019. The annual headline inflation rate surged dramatically from 3.0 percent in 2019 to 84.9 percent in 2020, and continued to rise to 221.3 percent in 2023. These inflationary pressures have significantly eroded the purchasing power of the LBP, contributing to widespread economic hardship. 

Lebanon hosts one of the highest numbers of refugees per capita in the world, with a significant population of Syrian and Palestinian refugees. Since 2011, over 1.5 million Syrians have sought refuge in Lebanon. The economic crisis has severely impacted these refugees, with an estimated 90 percent of Syrian households living in extreme poverty. Palestinian refugees, many of whom have been in Lebanon for decades, also face challenging conditions, including limited access to employment and social services. 

Lebanon primarily relies on food imports, which provide around 80 percent of national consumption requirements, with local production providing around 20 percent. Nevertheless, agriculture is still an important livelihood for many poor households. The main agricultural areas include the Coastal Strip, Akkar plain, Mount Lebanon, Beqaa Valley, and the Southern Hills. Fruit and olive trees occupy around 45 percent of the cultivated area. Most agricultural production is concentrated in the Beqaa Valley, which accounts for about 40 percent of the total cultivated land. The North, particularly Akkar and Koura, hosts around 40 percent of the country’s olive production, while fruit trees cover approximately 25 percent of the cultivated land. Large swathes of agricultural land have been exposed to heavy bombardment by the IDF since the onset of conflict in October 2023. The use of white phosphorous has led to farmland degradation and chemical pollution. Approximately 75 percent of farmers in the South governorate reported a loss of income months before the recent escalation in hostilities. 

Figure 2

Seasonal calendar for a typical year

Source: FAO

Follow these links for additional information: 

• Previous Lebanon Remote Monitoring Report: June 2024 to January 2025
• Latest Lebanon Key Message Update: September 2024
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology 
• FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis

Current anomalies in food security conditions as of October 2024

National

• On October 1, households across southern Lebanon received evacuation orders, prompting hundreds of thousands of people to flee from areas around the Litani River (including Saida, Tyre, El Nabatieh, and border villages of Bint Jbeil and Marjayyoun, Mhaibib, and Raymeh) to safer locations, including within Beirut’s city limits, Mount Lebanon, and as far north as Akkar. As such, conflict-induced displacement has increased sharply since the late September strikes. Households from the South, El-Nabatieh, and Bekka governorates, in addition to households in the southern suburbs of Beirut, have largely fled to the north (notably to Beirut and Mount Lebanon) (Figure 2). However, some households remain displaced in relatively safer areas within the South and Beqaa governorates, while others have not left their homes. Key areas currently impacted by Israeli hostilities include the city of Baalbek, the southern suburbs of Beirut, and over two dozen villages and towns in Southern Lebanon. 

Figure 3

Districts in Lebanon by number of IDPs departing and arriving, October 8 2023 – October 31 2024

Source: FEWS NET with data from IOM

• Since late September, humanitarian efforts to provide shelter and support to households displaced by conflict have scaled up. As of October 20, 192,000 people are registered in 1,100 collective shelters, which are mostly located in educational institutions. Over 85 percent of available shelters are already at full capacity and lacking basic necessities. A survey conducted by REACH shows 75 percent of IDPs are sheltering outside of government-run collective sites, and most IDPs report certain medications are unavailable. Among IDPs living outside of collective shelters, over a third reported being hosted by a relative or community member, while about a third reported living on the streets. 
• Though food import volumes remain at normal levels, the government began gradually phasing out its wheat subsidy after the World Bank’s loan agreement expired in May 2024. When coupled with gaps in humanitarian assistance and the impacts of conflict on food prices, households are spending more on food than usual amid reduced access to income-generating opportunities. Wheat prices increased by 18 percent in September alone and by 40 percent over the third quarter of 2024. According to WFP, a medium pack of Arabic bread (840 grams) now costs LBP 65,000 at bakeries, up from the previous price of LBP 55,000 for 800 grams before the subsidies were lifted. To this effect, high prices in conflict-affected areas and ongoing inflation nationwide is considerably straining household purchasing power and diminishing access to food. 
• Widespread and severe damage to roads, water, electricity, and telecommunications infrastructure, especially in southern Lebanon, is having a direct effect on key economic sectors critical for household income and economic growth. The tourism sector, traditionally a major contributor to the economy, has seen a further dramatic decline since late September 2024. The construction industry has also been significantly disrupted amid the widespread destruction of roads, bridges, and electric infrastructure, with many projects delayed or directly damaged. 
• In the 2024/25 marketing year, both wheat and barley production were likely below average due to the necessity of a  premature harvest; many households resorted to harvesting their crops in May instead of June to avoid largescale losses amid spreading wildfires. The wildfires were caused by the IDF’s use of white phosphorus munitions, which coincided with a period of above-average temperatures. 
• On October 3, IDF airstrikes targeted the Masnaa border crossing between Lebanon and Syria, the primary border crossing between the countries as it links Beirut and the Syrian capital of Damascus. The border crossing was closed and as of October 31, remains closed until further notice. The half a dozen other border crossings between the two countries remain open but continue to be targeted by the IDF. Closing of border crossings prevents movement across the border, preventing displaced households from seeking safety elsewhere and disrupts the flow of humanitarian aid through key routes. In addition, given that many Lebanese traders typically rely on informal cross-border trade and market activities, this is affecting household income among communities located along the eastern border.
• Targeting and destruction of key health, water, and sanitation infrastructure coupled with reduced access to food has increased the risk of infectious diseases, which is already seasonally elevated during the ongoing winter season, and this is likely contributing to rising levels of malnutrition in southern Lebanon and areas hosting high concentrations of IDPs. In Baalbak-El Hermel, for instance, a recent needs assessment report indicated that thousands of IDPs are living in schools, churches, and private homes that are not equipped with sufficient basic infrastructure to absorb the influx of people. This is resulting in overcrowding and placing pressure on the capacity of water and health facilities. Child malnutrition is also of concern in areas of Northern Lebanon with high populations of IDPs like Akkar, where UNICEF considers over 40 percent of children under five to be at high risk of malnourishment.

South Lebanon and Nabatieh governorates

• The intensification of conflict and resultant mass displacement since September has likely led to significantly below-average fruit, olive, vegetable, cash crop, and livestock production across southern Lebanon and in the Bekaa Valley. Furthermore, many farmers will not have any harvest at all, as they have been separated from their livelihoods due to displacement and the destruction of agricultural and livestock resources. 
• The October 8 bombing of a water weir on the Litani River cut an essential source of supplemental irrigation to around 6,000 hectares of farmland along southern/southwestern coastal areas, which fed farmland with more than 260,000 square meters of water per day. In addition, the use of incendiary weapons and targeting of water systems and farmland is directly affecting soil quality and water reserves, leading to the loss of hundreds of hectares of cash crops, such as olive groves. 

Humanitarian food assistance

• WFP and the Lebanon Food Security and Agriculture Sector (FSAS) partners are prioritizing food assistance deliveries to refugees and IDPs during the ongoing scale-up of emergency response. From September 23 to October 23, 2024, a total of 255,535 IDPs received emergency food assistance, including 192,000 inside shelters and 63,535 outside shelters. Beneficiaries receive a combination of hot and cold meals, Ready-To-Eat (RTE) rations, and food parcels that include packs of bread. Nearly 3.5 million hot and cold meals were distributed between the end of September and the end of October. IDPs in 1,030 shelters across Mount Lebanon, Beirut, Bekaa, Akkar, Baalbek-El Hermel, North, South, and EI Nabatieh governorates received 98 percent of the food distributed, while the remaining quantity was distributed among IDPs living outside of collective shelters. Of the 835,000 people that have been displaced since October 2023, less than 200,000 are registered in official collective shelters where the majority of HFA is being distributed. 
• The UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) activated its Emergency Response on September 24 and is currently operating 11 emergency shelters across Lebanon. As of October 24, a total of 1,056 Palestinian households (3,679 IDPs) were registered in UNRWA shelters (a relatively small proportion of the total 270,000 Palestinians in Lebanon). UNRWA, alongside local NGOs and INGOs, provides hot meals to displaced Palestinians in shelters. However, UNRWA has reported a decrease in the number of Palestinian refugees residing in shelters, especially in Tyre and Saida, due to some households returning to permanent refugee camps despite ongoing heavy airstrikes or securing alternative housing arrangements. 

Key assumptions about atypical food security conditions through May 2025

National assumptions

• Airstrikes are expected to continue countrywide, with the highest intensity anticipated in Nabatieh and South Lebanon governorates, in Beirut’s southern suburbs, and other Hezbollah stronghold areas. The strikes are expected to continue to drive widespread displacement.
• Foreign reserves are expected to continue to decline due to the loss of investment and damage to key economic sectors, leading to further depreciation of the LBP despite attempts by the Banque du Liban (BDL) to keep the LBP trading at around 90,000 LBP/USD. The most significant concern is that the declining value of the LBP will both affect public and private sector capacity to import sufficient food and lead to sharper increases in food prices compared to 2023, given Lebanon’s high dependence on imported food to meet demand. 
• In addition to concerns that the depreciating LBP will impact food import volumes and prices, the conflict is expected to continue to cause disruptions to market functionality and trade flows, namely due to the destruction of basic infrastructure that affects the transportation of food and ability to operate markets. There are also expectations of consumer stockpiling and hoarding in anticipating of potential shortages. Altogether, this is expected to result in periodic shortages of some goods to varying degrees and will contribute to the overall trend of high and rising staple food prices. 
• Wheat prices will continue trending upward through at least May, not only due to the abovementioned impacts of conflict, but also the phasing out of the wheat subsidy. The government’s inability to mobilize sufficient financial resources from both internal sources and external partners make it highly unlikely that the wheat subsidy will be replaced. As the gradual phasing out continues, there will most likely be a continued upward revision of the wheat flour price cap.
• Limited demand for labor in key industries, including agriculture, tourism, and construction, coupled with high competition for labor opportunities, is expected to suppress already-low casual labor wages. Together, these factors will both drive continued declines in household income and household purchasing capacity.
• The total area of land under wheat cultivation for the 2024/25 agricultural season is likely to be significantly below average and lower than the area planted during the 2023/24 season (approximately 30,000 hectares), primarily driven by impacts from conflict such as destruction of agricultural land.
• Cumulative precipitation during the 2024/25 precipitation season (November to February) is forecast to be below average, with a delayed onset of rainfall. In addition, above-average daily mean temperatures are likely through at least May. Above-average temperatures and below-average precipitation will result in moisture stress in rangelands and reduce water availability during the wheat and barley growing season, leading to yield losses amidst already low levels of planting. 
• Olive production in October/November 2024 will likely be significantly below average, given the widespread destruction of olive groves across southern, eastern, and parts of northern Lebanon, constraining a key income source for agricultural households. 

South Lebanon and Nabatieh governorates

• Limited IDF ground operations are likely to focus on clearing a buffer zone along the border and, in the process, will cause further destruction of villages and agricultural land in the border region and mass displacement. 
• For households that do not displace to other locations in Lebanon, few food and income sources will be available. Agricultural labor opportunities will be limited during the planting season due to the reluctance to rent harvesting equipment, a lack of adequate labor supply due to population displacement, the destruction of arable land by air strikes, and a decrease in the overall area cultivated. Crop sales income and casual labor wages will be similarly constrained by dysfunctional markets, displacement, and poor macroeconomic conditions.

Humanitarian food assistance

• The Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and the Lebanon Humanitarian Fund (LHF) have allocated 22 million USD in alignment with the Flash Appeal to kickstart the scale up of emergency response efforts. However, FEWS NET does not have access to the details of planned food assistance deliveries in terms of planned beneficiaries by area and the caloric equivalent of rations received. Regardless, it is anticipated that food assistance – whether meals, RTEs, or food parcels – will scale up in general and IDPs and refugees will be prioritized as beneficiaries. However, logistical barriers caused by conflict and insecurity may continue to result in a tendency to concentrate distributions in shelters, and IDPs outside shelters and/or living in hosting communities will most likely prove difficult to reach.
• Overall, longstanding regular food assistance which was normally distributed to poor Lebanese households and refugees is expected to decline in favor of scaling up assistance to conflict-affected populations. 

Projected acute food insecurity outcomes through May 2025

From October through May, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected across most of Lebanon, including in the most heavily conflict-affected areas and areas hosting large populations of IDPs and refugees (South Lebanon, El Nabatieh, Baalbak-El Hermel, Akkar, North Lebanon). Worsening conflict and macroeconomic conditions are expected to significantly restrict household access to key food and income sources, especially among poor, displaced, and Syrian and Palestinian refugee households. The conflict with Israel will result in more displacements, and households that remain in conflict-affected areas will continue to have limited access to income due to a lack of available labor opportunities. Across Lebanon more broadly, household purchasing capacity and access to food is expected to deteriorate due to both rising food prices and limited income-earning opportunities, with the potential that periodic disruptions in market supply will cause intermittent food shortages. Of particular concern are IDP households, who are expected to rely on a combination of income from limited labor opportunities and humanitarian food assistance but will most likely face moderate food consumption gaps and have to forego essential non-food expenses – such as medications and other healthcare – due to the loss of their livelihoods. It is also expected that displaced and poor households will increasingly resort to selling any productive assets that they may have for income to purchase food, to the detriment of their future coping capacity. 

In Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and Beqaa governorates, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected through at least May; however, a rising number of households are expected to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes in these areas. Mount Lebanon and Beqaa governorates have relatively less infrastructure damage due to the recent escalations in conflict but are expected to receive additional displaced populations. In Beirut, many households are facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, particularly in the southern suburbs that have been most heavily subjected to airstrikes. However, given both population density and higher coping capacity relative to rural and displaced populations, the share of the population facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) is expected to remain below the threshold for mapping Crisis (IPC Phase 3) at the area-level (20 percent).

Events that may change projected acute food insecurity outcomes

National 

De-escalation of hostilities through either formal or informal means

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: De-escalation would likely include the IDF largely withdrawing from Lebanon, maintaining only a presence within the 10-15 km buffer zone along the Southern border and a decrease in the frequency and scope of airstrikes across the country. In this scenario, the withdrawal of ground forces would most likely facilitate the return of displaced populations to their homes and permit some degree of engagement in their typical livelihoods. In addition, an easing of conflict would likely facilitate some recovery in market functionality. However, given the destruction of infrastructure to date, the timing of the agricultural seasons, and the level of investment required to rehabilitate key economic sectors, the degree of improvement during the October-May period of analysis would depend on the timing of de-escalation and a return to normal would be unlikely to occur in the near-to-medium term. As a result, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes would still be expected, but the number of households facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes would likely decline. 

IDF initiates larger-scale operations to push Hezbollah north of the Litani River

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: An escalation in hostilities would likely include expanded evacuation orders, intensified air attacks, and increased ground troop movements in areas south of the Litani River. The additional destruction of residential and agricultural infrastructure across southern Lebanon would drive increased numbers of IDPs fleeing these areas and would decrease access to livelihood assets for those that remain behind, with direct impacts on access to food and income. The population facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes would likely rise further than currently expected, particularly in northern Lebanon, which would most likely see a rising influx of IDPs that place further strain on already limited income-generating opportunities. Additionally, the number of households experiencing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes would likely rise across southern Lebanon. Should Beirut be subject to increased intensity of conflict, it is possible that more than 20 percent of the population would face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes.